Year: 2017
Type: dissertation
Abstract: I argue for a new account of the role of philosophical argument in changing a person’s core values. As philosophers, we tend to think it is possible to cause someone to change his values by directing some piece of reasoning at him. But that is often naïve, as can be seen by the trajectory of many political disputes: one side takes an argument to be persuasive, and the other refuses to accept it. As it happens, this is the exact progression of many Platonic dialogues. Socrates argues that his interlocutor’s core values are mistaken, and his interlocutor, despite being unable to identify where, if anywhere, the argument goes astray, rejects its conclusion. Is, then, argument out of work when it comes to changing a person’s core values? Many scholars, including Martha Nussbaum, Gregory Vlastos, and Alexander Nehamas, hold that Plato believes as much. On the standard view, Plato thinks that philosophical argument is an ineffective way of reforming a person’s life, and he rejects Socrates’ project, as outlined in the Apology, of using philosophical argument to persuade his interlocutors to value wisdom more than money, honor, and everything else. Against this standard view, I argue that Plato offers a compelling account of how philosophical argument can be effective at transforming a person’s values. As has not been appreciated by other scholars, Socrates uses his methods of refutation and exhortation in most cases not to advocate wisdom’s overriding importance, but rather to motivate pursuing wisdom merely for its instrumental value, and this because it is the instrumental pursuit of wisdom that is meant to be transformative. Socrates’ overall strategy, then, is not unlike that of the professor who recruits a student to philosophy with the promise that it will improve her LSAT scores, all the while anticipating that, once the student experiences the thrill of abstract, intellectual inquiry, she will lose her legal ambitions and devote herself to philosophical studies. What justifies this strategy, in our eyes and Plato’s, is that, in some important contexts, including the choice of a way of life, the right reasons can come into view only after taking up some practice, and so the practice cannot be motivated by the right reasons until it is taken up on some other basis.
Source: TSpace (University of Toronto)
Author: Jacob L. Stump
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3012111310