Year: 2019
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This dissertation concerns the philosophy of the first-person.It consists of three principal philosophical studies, each concerning a set of concepts that, when taken together, form a skeletal though unified account of the first-person.The first part concerns the various uses of the first-person singular ('I') as well as first-person immunity to error through misidentification.The second part concerns the various uses of the first-person plural ('we').I argue that (i) there are several distinct uses of the first-person plural pronoun, (ii) that each of these uses can be articulated inferentially, and (iii) that one use of the first-person plural-what I call the "generic use"-is conceptually basic.In the third part, I argue that the first-person plural pronoun is, at least on some of its uses, the grammatical mark of a certain form of self-conscious understanding, and it is this kind of self-conscious understanding that underwrites the possibility of speaking a language.I end by outlining some structural relations between the various uses of the first-person singular and the first-person plural.According to the account offered here, the first-person singular and the first-person plural form a non-additive unitary structure.Correctly understood, an account of the first-person must include both the first-person singular and the first-person plural.
Author: Quentin Andrew Fisher
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funders: Harvard University, University of Oxford
OpenAlex ID: W3015264061