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Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

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Year: 2010
Type: article
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.007
Authors: Florian Englmaier, Achim Wambach
Institutions: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, University of Cologne
Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: inequity aversion, moral hazard, optimal incentive contracts, sufficient statistics, incomplete contracts, performance indicators, team-based incentives, wage compression, equity concerns

Open Access status: green

Funder: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
OpenAlex ID: W3021575681
FWCI: 40.34
Cites: 98
Cited by: 252
Related to: 10
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