Year: 2016
Type: article
Abstract: We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, allowing them to provide loans to profitable firms during a crisis. Because of the services they provide, operating costs of relationship banks are higher than those of transaction banks. Relationship banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation lending at more favourable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers’ default, we test the theoretical predictions of the model. Received July 29, 2014; accepted February 20, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
Source: Review of Financial Studies
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhw041
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3022455051
