A Matching Model With Endogenous Skill Requirements>*
Year: 2002
Type: article
Abstract: We consider a labor market in which workers differ in their abilities and jobs differ in their skill requirements. The distribution of worker abilities is exogenous, but we model the choice of skill requirements by firms. High‐skill jobs produce more output than low‐skill jobs, but high‐skill jobs require high‐skill workers and thus are more difficult to fill. We use a matching model together with a Nash bargaining approach to wage setting to determine the equilibrium mix of job types, along with the equilibrium relationship between worker and job characteristics, wages, and unemployment.
Source: International Economic Review
Authors: JAMES ALBRECHT, SUSAN VROMAN
Institution: Georgetown University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3023700668
