Work

Extractive contest design

Year: 2020

Type: preprint

Abstract: We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that extract contestants' prize values. In the common-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium. In the observable-private-value case, there exists a CSF extractive in some equilibrium; there exists a CSF extractive in any equilibrium if and only if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to three or the values are homogeneous. In the unobservable-private-value case, there exists no CSF extractive in some equilibrium. When extractive CSFs exist, we explicitly present one of them.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2006.01808

Author: Kawamori, Tomohiko

Institution: Meijo University

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funder: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Award: Study on Contests with Outside Opportunities

OpenAlex ID: W3033662153

Cites: 23

Cited by:

Related to: 11