Work

The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self‐Defense

Year: 2020

Type: article

Abstract: Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self‐defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents’ entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can take.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12705

Author: Renée Jorgensen Bolinger

Institution: Princeton University

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3038186261