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The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for them. In the third stage, firms compete in Cournot fashion. The paper presents the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model.

Source: DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals)

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17218233

Author: Ohnishi, Kazuhiro

Language: English

Topic: Merger and Competition Analysis

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3040681932

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