What If I Don't Like Any Of The Choices? The Limits of Preference Elicitation for Participatory Algorithm Design
Year: 2020
Type: preprint
Abstract: Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment as a case study, we argue that optimizing for individual preference satisfaction in the distribution of limited resources may actually inhibit progress towards social and distributive justice. Individual preferences can be a useful signal but should be expanded to support more expressive and inclusive forms of democratic participation.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Robertson, Samantha, Salehi, Niloufar
Institution: University of California, Berkeley
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3042582152
