Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974; Joyce 2009; Predd et al. 2009; Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this article, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy argument for probabilism to certain classes of infinite sets of propositions, including countably infinite partitions.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2021.37
Author: Mikayla Kelley
Institution: Stanford University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,255
OpenAlex ID: W3045792508