A Game Theoretic Perspective on the Utterance Selection Model for Language Change
Year: 2020
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Many mathematical models for language change have recently been proposed and their interpretation is not always straightforward. In this paper, we take a closer look at the Utterance Selection Model with preferences and reinterpret its dynamics in terms of evolutionary game theory. The analysis demonstrates that the preference associated with a variant is formally equivalent to the payoff of using that variant in the associated game. Importantly, this payoff is subjectively perceived by speakers and evolves according to the current local use of the variant. Additionally, the accommodation to others' utterances can be encoded as a mutation term in a Replicator-Mutator equation. This analysis demonstrates how arbitrary variants can acquire fitness through usage, allowing selective processes to take place.
Author: Jérôme Michaud
Language: English
Subfield: Cultural Studies
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3083224242