There Are No Mathematical Explanations
Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: If ontic dependence is the basis of explanation, there cannot be mathematical explanations. Accounting for the explanatory dependency between mathematical properties and empirical phenomena poses insurmountable metaphysical and epistemic difficulties, and the proposed amendments to the counterfactual theory of explanation invariably violate core commitments of the theory. Instead, mathematical explanations are either abstract mechanistic constitutive explanations or reconceptualizations of the explanandum phenomenon in which mathematics as such does not have an explanatory role. Explanation-like reasoning within mathematics, distinction between explanatory and nonexplanatory proofs, and comparative judgments of mathematical depth can be fully accounted for by a concept of formal understanding.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/711479
Author: Jaakko Kuorikoski
Institution: University of Helsinki
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3083497976