Work

An auction market for journal articles

Year: 2009

Type: article

Abstract: We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

Source: Public Choice

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9571-3

Authors: Jens Prüfer, David Zetland

Institutions: Tilburg University, University of California System, University of California, Berkeley

Language: English

Topic: Publishing and Scholarly Communication

Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,090

Funder: University of California, Davis