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‘Mistake overturned, so I call it a lesson learned’:1 The Conservatives

Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: When all is said and done, what might be the most surprising thing about the Conservative Party’s victory in 2019 was how unsurprising it was. As the UK voted on 12 December, almost every poll had the Tories ahead by at least six percentage points (BBC, 2019). And yet much was made during the campaign itself of the result being supposedly hard to call (Pienaar, 2019). This was partly perhaps because commentators were chastened by unexpected results in 2015 and 2017. But it was also because, in early October, the British Election Study (BES) had shown that the electorate was the ‘most volatile in modern times’ (British Election Study, 2019), with even the godfather of psephology (indeed, the inventor of the term) Sir David Butler stating that he had ‘never felt more confused and uncertain’ about an electoral outcome (Payne, 2019). Yet the dawn which broke on 13 December brought Conservatives what for some of them must have been delayed gratification: this was the victory that 2017 was supposed to have been. The difference, as Johnson’s former colleague from City Hall Guto Harri argued, was in the execution: ‘he’s got the same deck of cards as Theresa May, but he’s played them differently’ (McTague, 2019). One of the more interesting analogies made during the general election came from an unusual source. Matthew McGregor—a veteran digital political strategist who had worked on Obama’s re-election campaign in 2012, but also extensively for the Labour Party and Blue State Digital—argued that to understand everything you needed to know about the Conservative Party strategy in 2019, you should go back not to 2017 but rather to 2008: I worked for the Labour Party in 2008, for Boris Johnson’s first mayoral run … and they had very little to say. I mean the entire campaign was, ‘I’m going to get rid of bendy buses’ … he makes himself a very, very big character outside of election time and then in election campaigns he makes himself as small a target as he possibly can and just tries to dance his way through without taking too many hits. So, they’ve built up all the momentum before the election campaign and now they’re trying to coast through quietly. (Commons People, 2019) It might well be the case, nonetheless, that Conservative Campaign Headquarters (CCHQ) had also learned the hard lessons from a 2017 campaign that put Theresa May front and centre—in terms of direct mail and leaflets, if not during TV debates. Part of this approach was down to Isaac Levido, the election strategist who had worked on the 2015 Cameron campaign and Scott Morrison’s surprise re-election in Australia earlier in 2019. Levido was said to favour a ‘safety-first’ approach and ‘insisted on strict message discipline … rarely veering from [Johnson’s] slogan to “Get Brexit Done”, and dodging the most difficult television interviews that risked tripping him up’ (Donaldson and Ross, 2019). The campaign, full of ‘clunking metaphors’ (Johnson, 2019) such as driving a JCB through a wall to symbolise breaking the parliamentary deadlock was, in fact, ‘classic Johnson, giving the appearance of chaotic joviality’ whilst in reality ‘saying nothing to distract from the campaign script’ (McTague, 2019). The Conservative Party manifesto itself is a neat encapsulation of this approach. It came in at just over 60 pages, nearly half that of Labour’s, and was so bereft of detail that PoliticsHome dubbed it the ‘meh-nifesto’ (Langford, 2019). It contained relatively modest spending proposals of £2.9 billion, especially when compared with the Liberal Democrats' £63 billion and Labour’s £83 billion. This made some in CCHQ anxious, with Labour being perceived as the party of change and the Tories as the party of more of the same (BBC, 2020). But it reflected a calculated gamble. Whilst the Tories might well have been seen as failing to properly address nearly ten years of austerity, they hoped that Labour’s more full-hearted approach to public spending would simply be seen as unrealistic (Partington, 2019). Ultimately, that gamble paid off. Moments like Culture Secretary Nicky Morgan coming unstuck on Good Morning Britain with regards to how many of the promised 50,000 new nurses were in actuality ‘new’, represented little more than one of a few fleeting ‘gotcha’ moments of the campaign, rather than more fundamental dissections of a manifesto which was otherwise seen as a more viable offer than Labour’s. Michael Gove, whilst disagreeing that the manifesto was ‘light’, admitted as much when suggesting that it was ‘written in such a way as to make sure that people had a clear sense of the direction we wanted to take the country and also to avoid some of the rows and distractions that had derailed Theresa’s campaign in 2017’ (BBC, 2020). It was, indeed, left to the public to apply the rich chiaroscuro to the (relatively) blank canvas. Whilst surely a hangover from the failures of 2017, this strategy might also have reflected an acceptance amongst party higher-ups, including Johnson himself, that he could be a rather ‘marmite’ figure. We know from work conducted by the campaign organisation Who Targets Me that all parties were relentlessly A/B testing all kinds of messaging during the early stages of the campaign on Facebook (Doward, 2019). This led to the Conservatives adopting varied marketing strategies, depending on the constituencies they were targeting. In Leave-voting constituencies, adverts solely featuring Johnson were favoured, whereas in Remain-voting constituencies, (negative) adverts solely featuring the opposition were favoured (Who Targets Me, 2019). In terms of campaign management, then, there was a pretty basic cost–benefit analysis at play. There was simply more to be lost than gained from Johnson being overly visible on the election trail. If that meant taking short-term reputational damage from, say, appearing only as an ice sculpture at a Channel 4 debate on climate change, or refusing a sit-down interview with BBC Rottweiler Andrew Neil, then so be it. As Michael Gove put it, when asked whether it was a mistake for Johnson not to be questioned by Neil (BBC, 2020): No. We won … with the best will in the world … the purpose of running an election campaign is to win so that you can govern the country well, not to agree to every broadcast bit. Indeed, those rare occasions when Johnson did encounter significant scrutiny suggested the Tories’ less-is-more strategy was a sensible one. The final days of the campaign witnessed farcical scenes featuring Johnson seeking refuge in a large fridge to hide from a particularly enthusiastic Good Morning Britain reporter, as well as a slightly more sinister pocketing of a reporter’s phone when he confronted the PM with a picture of a child forced to sleep on a hospital floor. Despite all this, when Johnson did put himself forward for scrutiny in head-to-head leaders’ debates he performed as well, if not marginally better than Jeremy Corbyn, at least in as much as these things can be measured. Both the BBC and ITV debates were effectively fought to a ‘score draw’. YouGov found 51% of voters backing Johnson as the winner in the ITV debates (Ibbetson, 2020) whereas the BBC debates (Smith, 2019)—held a full three weeks later—had Johnson on 52% to Corbyn’s 48%. If, on the issues there was little between the two, when the public were asked who would make the best prime minister, there was considerably more daylight. According to a post-election poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft, 49% of voters said that Johnson would make the best prime minister, with just 31% saying the same of Corbyn (Ashcroft, 2019a). Finally, a more light-hearted poll, released just days before the election might have been the clearest indication of the public’s true feelings, suggesting Johnson was simply seen as the best of a not particularly desirable bunch. YouGov (2019a) asked ‘If you had to, which of the main party leaders would you most like to spend Christmas Day with?’; here, excluding ‘don’t knows’, Johnson was the clear winner. He stood alone at 22%, with Corbyn on just 14%, Farage on 10% and Swinson and Sturgeon on 8%. With any election, you do need a little bit of luck, and many problems that the Conservatives faced—or might have faced—were quickly nullified by weaknesses in their opposition. For example, the first week of the campaign got off to a rocky start when Welsh Secretary Alun Cairns resigned over claims that he was aware of a former aide’s hand in ‘sabotaging’ a rape trial and Jacob Rees-Mogg apologised when appearing to imply that Grenfell Tower victims lacked common sense (O’Donoghue, 2019). However, at the same time, Corbyn had to contend with two (former) MPs doing the rounds of the weekend politics shows urging voters not to plump for the Labour Party. Similarly, the London Bridge terror attack might well have been a moment in which cuts to defencing and policing were brought front and centre, but in the eyes of many, Corbyn now lacked the moral authority to make that argument. The Conservatives might also have been tripped up by a rather unhelpfully timed visit from Donald Trump but he—aside from suggesting that the US would not ‘take’ the NHS ‘if you handed it to us on a silver platter’ and describing Johnson as ‘very capable’—largely stood aside from the fray (Langford, 2019). From Johnson’s victory in the leadership contest, we know, and have always known, that one thing Johnson can do is excite the Conservative base—and the organisational shortcomings that plagued the Conservative campaign in 2017 were lessened here. Whilst membership was still well below that of Labour (as of July 2019 the Conservatives had around 180,000), it still represented a modest increase on the 2017 number which stood at circa 150,000. Moreover, Labour membership, whilst still impressive, had reportedly fallen off considerably since ‘peak Jeremy’. PoliticsHome, in July 2019, had the ‘bleakest’ report that Labour membership had dropped to 485,000, from the 518,659 reported in the 2018 accounting returns to the Electoral Commission 2019), and nearly a full down from the of reported in December 2017 2019). The of membership did mean that the during the election campaign alone that of the Labour in were as as any the UK or the Brexit as reported an of campaign in 2019, which is below Labour’s of And there is little to be gained from the that and the Brexit Party even in these that many of their or will have in there was from their Moreover, Conservative were to in campaign than they were in 2017 or 2015 2019, Party that some of an Conservative membership admitted to time at all to in 2019, compared to in 2017 and just in campaign of the been most of the it been more for the For the for Labour’s in in 2017 and in 2019. of the things did party do for their parties during the 2019 Election in since 2017. 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The election that it had many of the more fundamental that the electoral it can with the by the to be This work was by the and number and would also like to their colleague on the
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