Work

Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Year: 2020

Type: article

Abstract: This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

Source: Sustainability

DOI: 10.3390/su12208602

Authors: Haitao Chen, Zhaohui Dong, Gendao Li

Institutions: Jilin University, Changchun University of Science and Technology

Language: English

Topic: Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Responsible consumption and production, Industry, innovation and infrastructure, Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $1,901