Year: 2020
Type: article
Abstract: Goodman and Lederman (Philos Stud 177(4):947–952, 2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
Source: Philosophical Studies
Authors: Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern
Institutions: University of Glasgow, University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,750
Funder: University of Edinburgh
OpenAlex ID: W3093465906