Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content.
Source: New Journal of Physics
Authors: Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,610
OpenAlex ID: W2064906520