Year: 2020
Type: report
Abstract: Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity preservation. An important, and so far overlooked, aspect of reality is the diverse strategic identities of individuals. While applying the same strategy to all interaction partners may be an acceptable assumption for simpler forms of life, this fails to account for the behavior of more complex living beings. For instance, we humans act differently around different people. Here we show that allowing individuals to adopt different strategies with different partners yields a very rich evolutionary dynamics, including time-dependent coexistence of cooperation and defection, systemwide shifts in the dominant strategy, and maturation in individual choices. Our results are robust to variations in network type and size, and strategy updating rules. Accounting for diverse strategic identities thus has far-reaching implications in the mathematical modeling of social games.
Authors: Sendiña-Nadal, Irene, Leyva, Inmaculada, Perc, Matjaž, Papo, David, Jusup, Marko, Wang, Zhen, Almendral, Juan A., Manshour, Pouya, Boccaletti, Stefano
Institutions: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, China Medical University, University of Maribor, Complexity Science Hub, China Medical University Hospital, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Lille, Sciences Cognitives et Sciences Affectives, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Persian Gulf University, National Research Council
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3101224460