Year: 2020
Type: preprint
Abstract: What (if anything) justifies the use of Bayesian statistics in science? The traditional answer is that Bayesian statistics is simply an instance of orthodox expected utility theory. Thus, Bayesian statistical methods, like principles of utility theory, are justified by norms of individual rationality. In particular, most Bayesians argue that a scientist's credences must satisfy the probability axioms if she adheres to norms of practical and epistemic (individual) rationality. We argue that, to justify Bayesian statistics as a tool for science, it is necessary that a scientist's public credences (i.e., her degrees of belief qua scientist) obey the probability axioms. We claim that norms of collective science help justify this restricted view, termed public probabilism.
Authors: Conor Mayo‐Wilson, Aditya Saraf
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3111731321