Year: 2022
Type: article
Abstract: A common goal in the areas of secure information flow and privacy is to build effective defenses against unwanted leakage of information. To this end, one must be able to reason about potential attacks and their interplay with possible defenses. In this article, we propose a game-theoretic framework to formalize strategies of attacker and defender in the context of information leakage, and provide a basis for developing optimal defense methods. A novelty of our games is that their utility is given by information leakage, which in some cases may behave in a non-linear way. This causes a significant deviation from classic game theory, in which utility functions are linear with respect to players’ strategies. Hence, a key contribution of this work is the establishment of the foundations of information leakage games. We consider two kinds of games, depending on the notion of leakage considered. The first kind, the QIF -games , is tailored for the theory of quantitative information flow. The second one, the DP -games , corresponds to differential privacy.
DOI: 10.1145/3517330
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Funders: European Commission, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology
OpenAlex ID: W3114739256