Work

Meeting or Beating Analyst Expectations in the Post‐Scandals World: Changes in Stock Market Rewards and Managerial Actions*

Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: The pressure to meet/beat analysts' expectations is often blamed for the recent onslaught of accounting scandals. We investigate changes in the meeting/beating phenomenon post-scandals and find that the stock market premium to meeting or just beating analyst estimates has disappeared while the premium to beating by a larger margin has diminished. In the post-scandals period, managers tend to meet or just beat analysts' forecasts less often. Further, managers rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals and more on earnings guidance. Consistent with lower earnings management, the relation between meeting/beating and future operating performance has increased post-scandals, suggesting that the decline in market premium is possibly unwarranted.
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121271314
FWCI: 52.4
Cites: 47
Cited by: 243
Related to: 10