Year: 2021
Type: article
Abstract: We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure. For two agents, we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann’s agreement theorem and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions from a 1995 work by Dawid and colleagues. For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a “no-trade” condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.
Source: Journal of Political Economy
DOI: 10.1086/714993
Language: Spanish
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funders: California Institute of Technology, United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation, Russian Foundation for Basic Research, Bar-Ilan University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, National Research University Higher School of Economics, University of California, San Diego
Award: G2149862056
OpenAlex ID: W3121368779