Work

Private International Debt with Risk of Repudiation

Year: 2006

Type: article

Abstract: The risk of repudiation plays a central role in the size and nature of international capital flows. In this paper the author addresses the question of whether, in a world of international capital flows with risk of default, strategic externalities provide a rationale for regulation of international borrowing. The author models centralized arrangements of international debt in which only governments borrow and lend internationally and decentralized arrangements in which individuals have access to international markets. The author shows that a centralized setup allows more international risk sharing than a decentralized setup.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/503755

Author: Karsten Jeske

Institution: Federal Reserve

Language: English

Topic: Global Financial Crisis and Policies

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Partnerships for the goals

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3121590735

FWCI: 9.641

Cites: 14

Cited by: 77

Related to: 10