Work

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Chinese Listed Firms

Year: 2009

Type: article

Abstract: We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their state-owned shareholders to examine whether companies benefit or lose from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors. Minority shareholders seem to be expropriated in firms controlled by local governments, firms with a large proportion of local government directors on their board, firms without central government directors, and firms in provinces where local government bureaucrats are less likely to be prosecuted for corruption. In contrast, firms controlled by the central government (or having central government affiliated directors), benefit in related party transactions with their government parents.

Source: European Finance Review

DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfp024

Authors: Yan-Leung Cheung, P. Raghavendra Rau, Aris Stouraitis

Institutions: Hong Kong Baptist University, Purdue University West Lafayette, City University of Hong Kong

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3121644316

FWCI: 8.033

Cites: 33

Cited by: 212

Related to: 10