Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don't know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms. Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms. Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns. (JEL D21, D83, G12, G14, L11)
Source: American Economic Review
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1275133
Authors: Viral V Acharya, Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer
Institutions: New York University, Stanford University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: information release, stock return skewness
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121692289
