OpenAlex
PricingAboutJobs
Log inGet started
Work

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit

HTML

Year: 2008
Type: article
Source: Journal of Monetary Economics
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1290312
Authors: Antje Berndt, Anurag Gupta
Institutions: Carnegie Mellon University, Case Western Reserve University
Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Subfield: Finance
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: originate-to-distribute model, bank lending, moral hazard, adverse selection, loan sales, secondary loan market, relationship banking, bank monitoring, loan quality, disclosure regulation, clearinghouses, banking regulation

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121787517
FWCI: 21.38
Cites: 67
Cited by: 214
Related to: 8
OpenAlex
Nonprofit
Open DataOpen Data
Open Source
Product
Search
Compare
Pricing
Repositories
Unpaywall
Unsub
Developers
API docs
Data snapshot
Status
Source code
Organization
About
Team
Testimonials
Brand
Jobs
Community
Help center
Contact
Events
Blog
Mailing list
Supporters
Legal
Privacy
Accessibility
Terms