Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach*
Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: We provide a direct estimate of the magnitude of agency costs in publicly-held corporations. We compute an explicit performance benchmark that compares a firm's actual Tobin's Q to the Q* of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm having the same inputs and characteristics as the original firm. The Q of the average sample firm is around 16% below its Q*, equivalent to a $1,432 million reduction in its potential market value. We relate the shortfall in value to the incentives provided to CEOs. Boards appear to grant CEOs too few shares and too many options which are insufficiently sensitive to firm risk.
Source: The Journal of Business
DOI: 10.1086/497040
Authors: Michel A. Habib, Alexander Ljungqvist
Institutions: University of Zurich, New York University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121869535
