Work

Firm Value and Managerial Incentives: A Stochastic Frontier Approach*

Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: We provide a direct estimate of the magnitude of agency costs in publicly-held corporations. We compute an explicit performance benchmark that compares a firm's actual Tobin's Q to the Q* of a hypothetical value-maximizing firm having the same inputs and characteristics as the original firm. The Q of the average sample firm is around 16% below its Q*, equivalent to a $1,432 million reduction in its potential market value. We relate the shortfall in value to the incentives provided to CEOs. Boards appear to grant CEOs too few shares and too many options which are insufficiently sensitive to firm risk.
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121869535
FWCI: 12.48
Cites: 89
Cited by: 270
Related to: 9