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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information

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Year: 2010
Type: article
Source: Journal of Financial Intermediation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2010.01.001
Authors: Allen N. Berger, Marco A. Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, Nathan H. Miller
Institutions: University of South Carolina, Tilburg University, International Monetary Fund, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, United States Department of Justice
Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Subfield: Finance
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: collateral, information asymmetry, adverse selection, credit rationing, private information, information technology adoption, credit markets

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3121967467
FWCI: 22.11
Cites: 72
Cited by: 250
Related to: 10
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