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Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
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Year:
2010
Type:
article
Source:
Journal of Financial Intermediation
DOI:
10.1016/j.jfi.2010.01.001
Authors:
Allen N. Berger,
Marco A. Espinosa-Vega,
W. Scott Frame,
Nathan H. Miller
Institutions:
University of South Carolina,
Tilburg University,
International Monetary Fund,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
United States Department of Justice
Language:
English
Topic:
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Subfield:
Finance
Field:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain:
Social Sciences
Keywords:
collateral,
information asymmetry,
adverse selection,
credit rationing,
private information,
information technology adoption,
credit markets
show all 7
Open Access status:
green
OpenAlex ID:
W3121967467
FWCI:
22.11
Cites:
72
Cited by:
250
Related to:
10