Ownership and Control of German Corporations
Year: 2001
Type: article
Abstract: In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.
Source: Review of Financial Studies
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/14.4.943
Authors: Julian Franks, Colin Mayer
Institutions: London Business School, University of Oxford
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3122060417
