Work

How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

Year: 2004

Type: article

Abstract: The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change—whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

Source: Experimental Economics

DOI: 10.1023/b:exec.0000026979.14590.3c

Authors: Gary Charness, Guillaume R. Frechette, John H. Kagel

Institutions: University of California, Santa Barbara, Harvard University, The Ohio State University

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Ohio State University

OpenAlex ID: W3122395093

FWCI: 29.82

Cites: 7

Cited by: 217

Related to: 18