Work

Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats

Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause great damage. Agency theory’s insistence to link the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance as selfish extrinsic motivation is reinforced. Based on the common pool approach to the firm, institutions are proposed, serving to raise intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. More importance is to be attributed to fixed pay and strengthening the legitimacy of authorities by procedural fairness, relational contracts, and organizational citizenship behavior.
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3122451583
FWCI: 35.27
Cites: 195
Cited by: 281
Related to: 9