The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence
Year: 2014
Type: article
Abstract: What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which increased predictability of play and promoted cooperation when strangers could trade help for a token. (JEL C71, C73, D40, E42)
DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.290
Authors: Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Institutions: Chapman University, University of Bologna
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3122544652
