Work

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Year: 2009

Type: article

Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tiebreaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)

Source: American Economic Review

DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954

Authors: Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth

Institutions: Duke University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3122595055

FWCI: 46.47

Cites: 63

Cited by: 505

Related to: 8