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An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender–receiver game

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Year: 2007
Type: article
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014
Authors: Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, Marc Vorsatz
Institutions: University of Edinburgh, Maastricht University
Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: truth-telling, strategic information transmission, sender-receiver games, lying, quantal response equilibrium, material incentives, experimental economics

Open Access status: green

Funders: University of Edinburgh, Generalitat de Catalunya, Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología
Award: G7427269672
OpenAlex ID: W2004465863
FWCI: 14.86
Cites: 29
Cited by: 261
Related to: 9
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