Work

Political Economy in a Changing World

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/682679

Authors: Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin

Institutions: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, National Research University Higher School of Economics

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3122932432

FWCI: 14.49

Cites: 40

Cited by: 79

Related to: 10