Work

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

Year: 2000

Type: article

Abstract: We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.

Source: Journal of Political Economy

DOI: 10.1086/317686

Authors: Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini

Language: English

Topic: Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3123458657

FWCI: 81.03

Cites: 34

Cited by: 771

Related to: 10