Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: This article empirically explores standard‐setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty‐free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
Authors: Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, Jean Tirole
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3123790548
