Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)
Source: American Economic Review
Authors: Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter
Institutions: University of Konstanz, University of Nottingham
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3123807625