Work

A Theory of Political Transitions

Year: 2001

Type: article

Abstract: We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity cost is low, for example, during recessions. The threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive, and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy, and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility. (JEL D72, D74, O15, P16)

Source: American Economic Review

DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.4.938

Authors: Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson

Institutions: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of California, Berkeley

Language: English

Topic: Political Conflict and Governance

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3123985485

FWCI: 70.6

Cites: 86

Cited by: 1,551

Related to: 10