Work

Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency

Year: 2011

Type: article

Abstract: We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.

Source: American Economic Journal Microeconomics

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140161

Authors: Matthew O. Jackson, Leeat Yariv

Institutions: Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Santa Fe Institute, Stanford University, California Institute of Technology

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3124158573

FWCI: 19.47

Cites: 83

Cited by: 203

Related to: 10