Year: 2019
Type: article
Abstract: Firms’ political donations can induce distortions in the allocation of public procurement contracts. In this article, we employ an advanced non-parametric efficiency model to study the public sector (cost) efficiency implications of such distortions. Using a unique dataset covering the Czech regions over the 2007-2014 period, we find that the efficiency of public good provision is lower when a larger share of public procurement contracts is awarded to firms donating to the party in power (‘party donors’). We link this efficiency difference to two underlying mechanisms: i.e. shifts in procurement contract allocations from firms with previous procurement experience to party donors, and the use of less restrictive allocation procedures that benefit party donors.
Source: World Development
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3374583
Authors: Vitezslav Titl, Kristof De Witte, Benny Geys
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,600
OpenAlex ID: W3124343164