Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: In second price Internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. We propose an internet auction model, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that late bidding in a fixed deadline auction can occur at equilibrium in auctions both with private values and with uncertain, dependent values. Late bidding may also arise out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of late bidding are severely attenuated in auctions that apply an automatic extension rule such as auctions conducted on Amazon. Field data show that there is more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding.
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
Authors: Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth
Institutions: University of Cologne, Harvard University
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,720
OpenAlex ID: W3124420245