Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns
Year: 2003
Type: article
Abstract: Financial economists seem to believe that takeovers are partly motivated by the desire to improve poorly-performing firms. However, prior empirical evidence in support of this inefficient management hypothesis is rather weak. We provide a detailed reexamination of this hypothesis in a large-scale empirical study. We find little evidence that target firms were performing poorly before acquisition, using either operating or stock returns. This result holds both for the sample as a whole and for sub-samples of takeovers that are more likely to be disciplinary. We conclude that the conventional view that targets perform poorly is not supported by the data.
DOI: 10.2307/4126741
Authors: Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe
Institutions: University of Alabama, University of Pennsylvania
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W3124426843
