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Peer Pressure and Moral Hazard in Teams: Experimental Evidence

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Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Authors: Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González, Stephen Rassenti
Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: peer pressure, moral hazard, team incentives, free-riding, shirking, individual incentives, peer monitoring, internet use, production level, incentive contracts

Open Access status: closed
OpenAlex ID: W3124888597
Cites:
Cited by: 9
Related to: 10
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