Product
Help
Pricing
About
Jobs
Log in
Get started
Work
Add to collection
Peer Pressure and Moral Hazard in Teams: Experimental Evidence
HTML
Details
Locations
Year:
2013
Type:
preprint
Source:
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Authors:
Brice Corgnet,
Roberto Hernán González,
Stephen Rassenti
Language:
English
Topic:
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Subfield:
Economics and Econometrics
Field:
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Domain:
Social Sciences
Keywords:
peer pressure,
moral hazard,
team incentives,
free-riding,
shirking,
individual incentives,
peer monitoring,
internet use,
production level,
incentive contracts
show all 10
Open Access status:
closed
OpenAlex ID:
W3124888597
Cites:
Cited by:
9
Related to:
10