Year: 2016
Type: article
Abstract: Most informal finance comes from family and friends. Existing informal finance theories cannot match two characteristics of family finance: family investors may accept below-market or even negative returns, yet borrowers often prefer formal finance. We argue that social preferences make family finance cheap but create shadow costs that nonetheless discourage its use: Committing family funds to risky investment displaces intrafamily insurance and undermines limited liability. The same characteristics that sustain familial insurance thus render family finance a poor source of risk capital. Even when overcoming capital constraints requires social ties, intermediation and semiformalization may therefore be crucial for promoting risk taking. Received April 29, 2013; accepted December 4, 2015 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.
Source: Review of Financial Studies
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhw031
Authors: Samuel Lee, Petra Persson
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
SDG: No poverty
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W3125026888
