Work

Competition for Status Creates Superstars: An Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.

Source: Journal of the European Economic Association

DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz001

Authors: Boris van Leeuwen, Theo Offerman, Arthur Schram

Institutions: Tilburg University, University of Amsterdam

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,668

Funders: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Universiteit van Amsterdam