Work

Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Year: 2015

Type: report

Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it.In a simple two-person disclosure game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information.The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average.Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but receiver actions and beliefs suggest they are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research

DOI: 10.3386/w21099

Authors: Ginger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca, Daniel Martin

Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, University of Maryland, College Park, Northwestern University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3125787152

Cites: 57

Cited by: 33

Related to: 10