Work

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Year: 2005

Type: article

Abstract: An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than either uniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results, it generates the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actual bid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.

Source: Review of Financial Studies

DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhj005

Authors: Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, Jaime F. Zender

Institutions: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Central Florida, University of Colorado Boulder

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W3125946166

FWCI: 5.827

Cites: 28

Cited by: 68

Related to: 10