The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples
Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: My epistemic goal in this lecture will be the simplest form of phenomenal selfconsciousness: I want to contribute to a deeper understanding of nonconceptual, pre-reflexive layers in conscious selfrepresentation. Conceptually, I will defend the claim that agency is not part of the metaphysically necessary supervenience-basis for bodily self-consciousness. On the level of new empirical data I want to show how out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and full-body illusions (FBIs) provide an interesting new entry point for investigating the nature of the phenomenal self. I will then proceed to sketch a new research program and advertise a new research target: ―Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood‖, ending with an informal argument for the thesis that agency, phenomenologically as well as functionally, is not necessary condition for self-consciousness. ―SMT‖: WHAT IS THE SELF-MODEL THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY? The goal of this chapter is to give a very brief summary of the ―self-model
Author: Thomas Metzinger
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W3128004077