Work

Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model

Year: 2021

Type: article

Abstract: Quantal response equilibrium choice (QREC) models are structural behavioral models that account for bounded rationality and strategic interactions in analyses of games where each player’s payoff is a vector. We revisit the question of how market competition affects pro-social behavior and fit a QREC model to data from an incentivized laboratory experiment, where participants make decisions on medical treatments for abstract patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly games. Our results demonstrate that competition can cause substantial behavioral responses without any changes in pro-social preferences if one allows for the possibility that competition influences the degree of randomness in decision making. We find that a QREC model with fixed preference parameters provides precise out-of-sample predictions of behavior in games with vector payoffs. A Monte Carlo study is performed to show that the two-step estimator is accurate.

Source: Journal of Choice Modelling

DOI: 10.1016/j.jocm.2021.100282

Authors: Ge Ge, Geir Godager

Institutions: University of Oslo, Akershus University Hospital

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,550

Funders: Norges Forskningsråd, Wuhan University, Universität zu Köln, Division of Mathematical Sciences